We investigate the effect of deportations under Stalin on the long run distrust in central authority. In the Soviet Union about 2.8 million people of nine ethnic groups were deported by Stalin from their homelands to Siberia and Central Asia in the 1940s. Unlike other deported ethnic groups, Germans, Crimean Tatars and Turks-Meskhetians were not rehabilitated after Stalin's death and stayed in the areas of their deportations till the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Using regional data from the 1991 referendum on the future of the Soviet Union and data from the Life in Transition survey, we find that deportations have a negative effect on trust in central authority. The long-term effect is stronger for unrehabilitated ethnic groups, especially Germans who were the most numerous deported ethnic group. The quantitative effect is significant: an increase in the share of deported Germans by 1% implies a decrease in the percentage of votes in favor of the Soviet Union in the referendum by 0.75% and a decrease in probability of trust in president by 5% nowadays.
Introduction

This paper investigates the impact of deportations during Stalin's reign in the Soviet
Union on trust in central authority. During Stalin's reign, nine ethnic groups were removed from their homelands in the Soviet Union. The most massive campaign was the deportation of Germans which started in 1941 and lasted for four years, and deportations continued with Karachais, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingushs, Balkars, Crimean Tatars and Turks-Meskhetians in [1942] [1943] [1944] . In each case, all people belonging to these ethnic groups were relocated to Siberia and Central Asia. Overall, there were more the 2.8 million deported people during that period and the most numerous deported ethnic group was Germans (about 1.4 million deported Germans).
The history of deported ethnic groups after the Stalin's death was different. All Caucasian groups were partially rehabilitated and allowed to move back to their historical homelands in the 1950s -1960s. However, three ethnic groups, Germans, Crimean Tatars and Turks-Meskhetians, did not have their rights restored and stayed in the regions of their deportation till the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Thus, the geographical variation in the regions of deportations and time variation in rehabilitation between different ethnic groups allow us to investigate the direct and long-term effects of Stalin's policy on people's trust in central authority.
Our main hypothesis is that the Stalin's odious policy of deportations led to the formation of a high distrust in central authority. We test this hypothesis by using two main sources of data. First, we use data on the national referendum on the preservation of the Soviet Union, which was carried out in March 1991. This referendum is a good proxy for trust in central authority. In the light of the growing nationalism and confrontation between the central authority and local elites in the early 1990s, voting against the Union can be interpreted as distrust in the central communist authority. Moreover, since most deported people from unrehabilitated deported groups were still present in the regions of deportations at the moment of the referendum, we can distinguish between a direct impact of deportations and its long-term effect. The long-term effect of deportations on trust is weak and insignificant. However, the direct effect of deportations of unrehabilitated ethnic groups is negative and significant. We find that an increase in the share of deported Germans by 1% implies a decrease in the share of votes for the preservation of the Union in the referendum by 0.75%. Second, to study the long-term effect of deportations we use individual level data from the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Life in Transition Survey (2006) . We believe that trust in president can be used as a proxy for trust in central authority. We find a significant negative effect of all deported people on trust in central authority, however the effect is stronger for Germans. Thus, an increase in the share of deported Germans by 1% implies a decrease in the probability of trust in president by 5%.
This might be because the Germans were the most numerous unrehabilitated deported ethnic group.
This result can have very important consequences for the economic development since lower trust hinders economic development (Fukuyama 1995) and higher distrust in government authority can lead to a higher demand for regulation (Aghion et al. 2010 ), which in turn may lead to a higher level of corruption and unofficial economy (Djankov et al. 2002) and lower economic growth (Djankov et al. 2006 ). This paper contributes to the recent growing literature that uses Russia's historical data to study long-run effects of institutional persistence (Acemoglu 2010 , Grosfeld et al. 2013 , Dower and Markevich 2014 . We also extend the literature on trust by showing that such repressive acts as Stalin's deportations have a long-run negative effect on trust in government authority.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We discuss the previous literature and motivation for the paper in Section 2 and provide the historical background of deportations in Section 3. Further we discuss our hypotheses and data correspondingly in Sections 4 and 5 and describe the empirical results in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Previous Literature
There has been a growing literature using Russia's rich historical data to study the longterm effects of history on economic development. Acemoglu et al. (2010) show that the severity of the Holocaust in Russia during the World War II is associated with a lower population, a greater support for the Communist party and lower wages today. Grosfeld et al. (2013) find that the current residents of the former Jewish Pale of Settlement vote less for pro-market liberal parties, support less democracy and market economy, and exhibit higher levels of generalized trust. Kuzmina et al. (2014) use the intensity of worker strikes in [1895] [1896] [1897] [1898] [1899] [1900] [1901] [1902] [1903] [1904] [1905] [1906] [1907] [1908] [1909] [1910] [1911] [1912] [1913] [1914] as an instrument to show the causal effect of governance quality on foreign direct investment. Markevich and Dower (2014) find that the difficulty of implementation of Stolypin's agrarian reform, measured by the amount of arsons, is positively associated with a preference for state property and a perception of the 1990s privatization as unfair.
It is a conventional wisdom in the literature that trust is an important determinant of economic development since it is a form of social capital. As Fukuyama (1995) notes, unlike human capital trust cannot be easily acquired and is usually transmitted through religion, tradition and historical habit. Hence, history is very important for the trust formation in the society.
Economists have tried to establish both theoretically and empirically the effect of trust on economic development. Putnam (1993) provides an example of differences in regional economic development between Northern and Southern Italy. According to him, the ruling elites in the South "destroyed horizontal ties of society in order to maintain the primacy of vertical ties of dependence and exploitation." This led to a lower level of generalized trust in the South, as an ability of society to work as a whole and poorer economic development, compared to the North. Shleifer et al. (1997) investigate the determinants of trust in large organizations and show that trust can be an important channel of influence of hierarchical religion on economic and social outcomes.
Higher distrust in government authority should be taken into account by politicians and is of a particular importance during the transition and reform period. The "new comparative economics" (Djankov et al. 2003) suggests that higher distrust in government authority caused by deportations leads to an institutional possibilities frontier steeper for a given decrease in a government control, which limits the available choice of reforms.
Lower trust is also very important for regulations. If the government authority knows that it is distrusted, it imposes a heavier regulation on all activities, which lowers trust further and may end-up with a bad self-enforcing institutional equilibrium. Aghion et al. (2010) show that a higher distrust in government can lead to a higher demand for government control and regulation. In particular, when people expect to live in a low-trusted community, they expect high levels of regulation and corruption and do not become civic. When their beliefs are justified, it leads to a bad equilibrium with a large share of uncooperative individuals who support heavy regulation. So distrust fuels the support for government control over the economy. In turn, the latter leads to slower economic development. There is evidence that a higher regulation of entry is associated with a higher level of corruption and an increase in the unofficial economy (Djankov et al. 2002) , whereas less burdensome business regulation corresponds to higher economic growth (Djankov et al. 2006 ). Thus, a higher distrust in government authority supports a bad institutional equilibrium.
We extend the previous literature by analyzing the effect of the past distinctive social policies, namely Stalin's deportation of Germans, on trust in central authority. As Fukuyama notes, "the Communist Party consciously sought to undermine all forms of horizontal association in favor of vertical ties between party-state and individuals which left post-Soviet society bereft of both trust and a durable civil society." 2 In particular, people deported by Stalin and their descendants do not trust the central authority anymore. Moreover, this effect can have a long-term damage for the future development of the society.
Historical Backgrounds
Overall there were nine ethnic groups who were totally removed from their homelands in the Soviet Union. 
[FIGURE 1 INSERT HERE]
There is no consensus in the literature about the real reasons for deporting each of the In figure 2 it can be seen that the distribution of deported people was very uneven in the country's territory. The regions of Siberia and Central Asia prevailed in the number of deported people. For example, about one million people were deported to Kazakhstan and one half of them were Germans. There were deported people in all regions of Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Uzbekistan, Turkmenia and Tajikistan. We use this geographical variation in the number of deported people in different regions of the republics of the Soviet Union and the difference in the time of their rehabilitation to study the long run effect of deportations on trust in government authority.
[FIGURE 2 INSERT HERE]
As one of proxies for distrust in the central communist authority, we use the results of the All-Union referendum, which was held in March 1991. This was the only All-Union referendum that took place during the Soviet period and there was only one question about preserving the Soviet Union. By that time, the disintegration processes had already started in the country which was attributed mostly to the unsatisfactory level of well-being and the emerging nationalism (Austin 1996). (a confederation). This New Union Treaty was never signed because disintegration processes in the country had gone too far.
Thus, taking into account the confrontation between the central authority, the republican authority, and national movements in the republics, voting in favor of the Union in the referendum in 1991 can be considered as trust in the central communist authority.
Hypotheses
The main hypothesis in the paper is that deportations of different ethnic groups within the Soviet Union could have a negative effect on trust in the central authority. We would like to distinguish between a direct effect and a possible long-term effect of deportations. For this purpose we use two different datasets. 
Data
We use data from several sources. The main source of data on deportations is Zemskov 
Data on the Referendum
We believe that trust in central government can be proxied by the share of votes in favor of the Union in the referendum on the preservation of the Soviet Union. We use regional level data on the referendum for four countries where there were deported people in 1940s and for which we have data on the number of deported people in regional division: these are Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kirgizia 9 . The results of the referendum for Russia were taken from "Electoral Geography" 10 . The outcomes of the referendum for other republics were copied from the official newspapers of the republics of Kirgizia and Uzbekistan and from regional official newspaper for Kazakhstan available through the Russian State Library. As we can see from table 1, the average share of votes for preserving the Soviet Union was equal to 81.1% with a standard deviation 11% and the average turnout was around 81%. There is one outlier in the very low percentage of votes in favor of the Union -Sverdlovskaya oblast in Russia which probably reflected the popularity of the former region's leader Boris Yeltsin who was strongly for disintegration of the Union.
The highest shares of votes in favor of the Union were observed in regions of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan up to 97% as Horezmskaya oblast and Kara-Kalpakskaya ASSR.
[TABLE 1 INSERT HERE]
9 We excluded Ukraine because there were only two regions in the East of the country with a relatively small number of deported people (Khersonskaya and Dnepropetrovskaya oblast with 186 and 460 people correspondingly) and the country differs a lot in terms of history and geography from the rest of the regions where people were deported to. When we include Ukraine in the analysis, the results do not differ qualitatively.
Data on controls (such as share of urban population, the share of people with higher education and the share of retirees in region's population) were taken from the Census carried out in 1989. The data on the average monthly wage of employers were taken from the annual statistics reports of CIS countries for 1990-1994 years. It should be noted that the administrative borders changed several times between 1953 (a year for which we have detailed data on deportations) and 1991 when the referendum took place. We merged and recalculated data from Census in 1989 and referendum for administrative borders in 1953 11 .
Data on Trust in President
To test further our hypothesis about the long-term effect of deportations on trust in central authority, we use data from the Life in Transition Survey (LIT In each of 29 countries 1,000 people were interviewed. The sample was selected in 2 stages in the survey. On the first step 50 primarily sample units (PSUs) were selected in each country with probability proportional to the size of the region, using as a measure of the size either the population, or the number of households. So PSU represents a locality in the metropolitan, urban or rural area. To execute the second step, 20 households were selected at random in each PSU.
We restrict the sample again to four countries where there were deported people in the 1940s and for which we have data on the number of deported people in regional division:
these are Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kirgizia. It should be mentioned that the administrative division of Soviet regions has changed since 1953. Using GIS software, we geocoded each PSU and restored the administrative borders in 1953 in Soviet Republics of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and then we merged geocoded locations from LIT survey with the administrative regions in 1953. Thus, we merged these individual level data from the survey with the regional level data on deportations. The geography of LIT locations and regions with deported people is shown on figure 3.
[FIGURE 1 INSERT HERE]
This sample from LIT survey covers 64 administrative regions from 1953. We exclude LIT locations which are large metropolitan areas and used to be the capitals of the republics during the Soviet period (Moscow, Saint-Petersburg, Almaty, Astana, Bishkek and Tashkent) because they were the metropolitan centers where people actively migrated to and it can contaminate the results 13 . Thus, this yields a cross-section sample of 3,520 individuals from 176 PSUs in Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kirgizia.
The main question of interest in the survey is about trust in president as an institution.
The question is the following: "To what extent do you trust the president?" The respondents had to choose an answer from six alternatives: (1) -"complete distrust", (2) -"some distrust", (3) -"neither trust nor distrust", (4) -"some trust", (5) -"complete trust", (6) -
"difficult to say". In each case, we code a dummy variable "trust" to be equal one in case of (4) and (5) 14 . The data contain detailed information on the respondent's characteristics which we use as controls. We show the descriptive statistics for LIT data in table 2.
[TABLE 2 INSERT HERE]
Data on Deportations
Data on deportations were taken from Zemskov (2003 15 Though Koreans could be considered as an unrehabilitated deported group, we do not consider them in the paper, because they were not special settler and there was no detailed statistics on deported Koreans.
Results
Direct Effect of Deportations on Trust in Central Authority
We use the cross-section sample which is formed by 97 regions of the former Soviet The share of people with higher education and of the urban population are measures which show how myopic the voters are. We also include in all specifications country (republic) dummies j D to capture country fixed effects.
In table 5 we show the estimation results for the basic specification. All coefficients on basic controls have the reasonable signs. The share of votes for the Union falls with a higher share of urban population in the region. The effect of higher education on voting for the Union is negative and the effect of the share of retired people is positive, though these effects are not significant. 16 Implicitly, we control on the size of region since we use not the number of deported people in the region in 1953, but its ratio to the number of population in the region at that time.
In columns (1), (2) and (3) we test the effect of the share of deported Germans, Crimean
Tatars and Turks-Meskhetians on the referendum outcome respectively. The effect of these deported groups is negative, but significant only for Germans. Thus, the increase in the share of deported Germans in the region's population in 1953 by 1% decreases the percentage of votes for preserving the Soviet Union by 0.75%. In column (4) we add all three deported ethnic groups. The effect of deported Germans is still significant, whereas the effect of deported Crimean Tatars and Turks-Meskhetians are negative but insignificant. We study the effect of these three ethnic groups separately because they were not restored in their rights till the end of the 1980s, so most deported people or their descendent were still living in the regions of their deportations and it allows us to measure the direct effect of deportations on trust in the central communist authority. In column (5) we estimate the direct effect of deportations of all three unrehabilitated ethnic groups. The effect is significant and implies that the increase of deported people from the unrehabiltated groups by 1% leads to 0.76% less votes for preserving the Soviet Union in the referendum.
Then in columns (6) and (7) we look at the effect of rehabilitated deported groups (the largest ethnicity from this group are Chechens). This effect is negative, however, it is smaller in magnitude than the direct effect of unrehabilitated groups and is insignificant.
Further, we add two additional controls. First, we control for nominal average wages of employees (in logarithms) in the region in 1990. This variable is used as a proxy for income and should help to eliminate an alternative explanation that deported people were moved to the regions with the aim of economic development of these regions and the observed effect is due to a higher economic development there. Second, we add the share of Russians in total population in the region in 1989 and its interaction with the dummy for republics other than Russia. In all Soviet republics there was a large number of Russians who theoretically should have voted against the disintegration of the Soviet Union because they could lose links with their homeland, relatives and even native culture and language. However, this explanation is applicable only to Russians who lived outside Russia in the Soviet Union. The influence of Russians who lived in Russia on the referendum's outcomes is otherwise ambiguous. The results of estimation with these additional controls are presented in table 6.
[TABLE 6 INSERT HERE]
The wages have a positive effect on voting in favor of the Union which might reflect the fact that richer people are more eager to save status-quo. We see that both the share of Russians and its interaction with dummy for non-Russia are strongly significant. The signs of the corresponding coefficients imply that the share of Russians has a positive influence on the percentage of votes in favor of the Union in all republics except for Russia, though this effect is not significant.
What is important that the coefficients on deported Germans and unrehabilitated deported people do not change significantly in magnitude and are still significant in specifications (1), (4), (5) and (7). An increase in the share of deported Germans or unrehabilitated deported people by 1% implies a decrease in the percentage of votes in favor of the Union in the referendum by 0.75% on average. At the same time, there is a weak negative effect of the share of rehabilitated deported people on the share of votes in favor of the Soviet Union in the referendum and this effect is insignificant.
Thus, we find a significant direct negative effect of deportations on trust in the central communist authority using 1991 referendum data. The effect is stronger for Germans which may reflect the effect that it was the most numerous unrehabilitated group. We do not see the significant long-term effect of rehabilitated deported groups on referendum outcomes.
.
Long-Term Effect of Deportations on Trust in Central Authority
To study the long-term effect of deportations on trust in central authority using LIT survey we run the following cross-section regression:
where i corresponds to an individual from LIT, l corresponds to a locality ( The results of estimation are presented in table 7. We do not provide coefficients on controls in the table for sake of space. In column (1) we see that the deported Germans have a significant negative effect on trust in president, whereas the influence of two other unrehabilitated deported groups (Crimean Tatars and Turks-Meskhetinians) is insignificant (the corresponding coefficients have a positive sign). When we combine all unrehabilitated deported groups in column (4), their total effect is still significant at 10% significance level, but it is driven by deported Germans. However, we find a weak significant negative effect of rehabilitated deported groups on trust in president in column (5). When we combine all deported people in in column (6), we see that though their effect is lower in magnitude than the effect of deported Germans, it is still significant.
[TABLE 7 INSERT HERE]
The stronger long-term effect of deportations on trust in central authority can be explained by the fact that it was the most numerous unrehabilitated deported ethnic group who stayed to live in the regions of deportations till the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
Even now a small number of Germans live in Kazakhstan and Russia. So there were more descendants of deported people from this group and they interacted more with the local population which could enhance the transmission of distrust in central authority.
We also estimate Probit model for specification (2) to be able to interpret the long-term effect of deported Germans and all deported people. We report the estimation results in table 8. Thus, an increase in the share of deported people in the region's population by 1% implies that on average the probability that people trust in president in the region decreases by 1.9%, whereas the negative effect of deported Germans is stronger and implies 5% decrease in probability of trust in president.
[ 
Conclusion
We find that deportations in the 1940s in the Soviet Union are associated with a lower level of trust in central authority later. Using the geographical variation in the regions of deportations and the variation in time of rehabilitation, we find a significant negative effect of deportations of unrehabilitated ethnic groups on voting in favor of the Union in the referendum in 1991. Thus, an increase in the share of deported Germans by 1% implies a decrease in the share of votes for the preservation of the Union in the referendum by 0.75%.
The effect seems to stay in the long-term period. Using individual level data from Life in Transition Survey we find that the more deported people were in the region in 1940s, the less people trust in president nowadays. We believe that the impact of deportations on trust in central authority is stronger for Germans because they were the most numerous unrehabilitated deported group. 
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